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Milan naval forum
| Ìîðñêîé ñëîâàðü |
A 1995 initiative of the indian navy, involving a biennial gathering of indian ocean navies to discuss common concerns, forge co-operation, and build friendship and mutual understand- middle 200 ing. current participants are australia, bangladesh, india, indonesia, malaysia, myanmar [burma], singapore, srilanka, and thailand. (milan is hindi for “tryst” or “meeting.”)
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Initiative, àíãëèéñêèé
- The procedure that allows voters to propose a law directly.
- A çà÷èíàòåëüíûé stricture
Friendship, àíãëèéñêèé
Understand, àíãëèéñêèé
Participants, àíãëèéñêèé
Bangladesh, øâåäñêèé
Participant, àíãëèéñêèé
- An actor who can access the ledger: read records or add records to.
- Ó÷àñòíèê
- A party that contributes to a process or assumes a role in a relationship.
- A person who is part of a conversation or conference, or a presenter or attendee in a meeting.
- A presenter or attendee in a meeting.
- A synchronization provider and its associated replica.
- A party of a funding. it usually refers to the lowest rank or smallest level of funding.
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Military deception, àíãëèéñêèé
Concerns misleading the enemy as to one’s capabilities, intentions, and operations; thereby causing him to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. ultimately, the intent is to favorably shape the enemy’s behavior, or to cause him to form an inaccurate impression of the battlespace. notable naval examples, one from antiquity and five during world war ii, were: • 480 bce; salamis: the persian fleet enjoyed a huge numerical superiority, so greek commander themistocles planned to lure them into the narrow gulf of salamis, where numbers would be less decisive. he had his trusted slave sicinnus “defect” to the persian camp, to tell young king xerxes the greeks were quarrelling among themselves (true) and would fall apart if attacked (false). xerxes leaped into the trap. after sending a 200-ship squadron to block the greek line of retreat at the far end of the gulf, and a detachment of marines to seize the islet of psyttaleia at its mouth, he ordered the main fleet to cut off any attempt at escape by embarking at sunset and remaining at sea overnight. at dawn, five hundred and fifty triremes in line abreast rowed towards three hundred greek warships inside the gulf. but they were tired after their night at the oars and lost cohesion splitting to pass on either side of psyttaleia. then, as they emerged on the other side, they saw the second deception— a corinthian squadron backing-water and hoisting sails in a feigned attempt at escape—each persian vessel surged forward, racing its neighbor for the honor of being first to strike, further distorting their battle line. the trap was sprung. greek trumpets blared, and the main fleet surged forward to grapple. the corinthians downed sail and rowed back to join them, and a detached squadron charged in from the flank to smash through the banks of oars and thrust their wicked beaks into the fragile side planks of enemy ships. the rout was close to total. • 1942; operation torch: when its agents reported large numbers of ships passing through the strait of gibraltar for the north african invasion, the german high command assumed they were another supply convoy heading for malta. hitler, however, believed they were an invasion force. so did italian dictator mussolini, who correctly forecast vichy french north africa as the objective, but hitler disregarded his ally and ordered large air and submarine forces to assemble in the sicilian narrows to forestall an amphibious assault on libya. the allies encouraged this belief with two ruses. first hms janine (undamaged) radioed a plain language distress message, saying she was sinking hundreds of miles east of where she really was. then, the central and eastern task forces steamed well beyond their objectives as though heading for libya, waiting for darkness before reversing course to head for the real invasion beaches. • 1943; operation mincemeat: the capture of sicily— which would open the mediterranean to allied shipping and give them a foothold in europe—was such an obvious strategic objective that winston churchill said “everyone but a bloody fool would know it.” accordingly, british naval intelligence mounted an elaborate deception plan. the corpse of a 34-year-old man was given the identity papers of a fictional major of royal marines, placed in a steel canister filled with dry ice, and taken on board british submarine hms seraph. a briefcase, attached to his wrist by a bank-courier’s chain, contained forged official documents and a series of letters from senior officers in england to commanders in the field, covering subjects so “sensitive” that they justified being hand-carried rather than sent through regular channels. one of these was a personal letter from the vice chief of the imperial general staff (sir archibald nye) to “my dear alex” (sir harold alexander, commander, 18th army group). among other things, nye discussed two totally fictitious amphibious landings. operation husky (the real code name for the sicily invasion) was identified as a major assault on greece, while a secondary invasion of sardinia was given the invented code name operation brimstone. nye then outlined purported deception plans, ending with “we stand a very good chance of making them think we are going for sicily.” there was also a letter from admiral lord louis mountbatten (chief of combined operations) introducing his subordinate “major martin” to “abc” (andrew browne cunningham, allied naval c-in-c in the mediterranean) and ending with a rather forced joke about “sardines,” hoping the germans would see it as a veiled reference to the “brimstone” operation. to give verisimilitude to the impersonation, the stubs of recent theater tickets were stuffed into the marine’s battledress pockets along with fabricated personal objects. several private letters included one from his bank manager demanding payment of an overdraft, while more intimate items included love letters from a fictitious fiancee, her photograph (actually of an admiralty clerk), and the jeweler’s bill for her engagement ring. before dawn on 30 april, seraph surfaced near the town of huelva, where with the spanish authorities were known to be friendly to german intelligence. the “major” was removed from his can- 201 military ister and gently pushed overboard. before tide and currents could wash him ashore as intended, the body was found by a local fisherman and handed over to the spanish armada, whose pathologists (as hoped) diagnosed that fluid in his lungs—due to the pneumonia that killed him—was consistent with death by drowning after an airplane crash. to further the deception, the british naval attache was directed to demand immediate return of the papers. after twelve days, the briefcase was handed over and british forensic experts were able to confirm that the envelopes had been opened and resealed. mussolini still believed sicily would be the primary target, but hitler believed the deception, redirecting reinforcements from sicily to sardinia and corsica, and sending renowned general rommel to assume command in greece, where german forces were augmented by an entire panzer division moved all the way from france. even after the sicily landings, the germans remained convinced the main attacks would come later in sardinia and greece, keeping forces there until after the allied beachhead was secure. this embarrassing “sting” made german intelligence officers so suspicious that they dismissed genuine top-secret documents found in an abandoned landing craft that washed ashore in normandy shortly after d-day, and others found in a crashed glider near arnhem in september 1944. • 1944; fortitude north: this deception plan was aimed at keeping the 27 german divisions in norway from reinforcing normandy when the amphibious invasion began. a fictitious british “fourth army,” supposedly headquartered in edinburgh castle, swamped the radio waves with messages such as “vii corps needs instructors in the bilgeri method of mountain climbing” and “80 division requires 1,800 pairs of kandahar ski bindings.” russian agents compounded the deception, and the nazi troops remained in scandinavia. • 1944; fortitude south: a much larger fictitious unit—“first united states army group” (fusag), said to be commanded by american general george patton, whom the germans considered the best allied tactician—also used false signals and the messages of double agents to persuade the enemy that the allies could muster 95 to 97 divisions when only 35 were available. while the real invasion force under british general bernard montgomery was secretly assembling in southwestern england, german radio intercept and intelligence organizations were persuaded that fusag would mount the main assault on the pas-de- calais. consequently, hitler considered the normandy landings only a diversion and withheld strategic reserves, making the german response to the beachhead far weaker than it could have been. • 1945; operation tucson: on 10th july, task force 38, the powerful striking force of the united states third fleet, bombed tokyo; then headed north under strict radio silence to strike southern hokkaido and northern honshu. simultaneously, uss tucson (cl-98) turned south. after several hours of high-speed steaming she broke radio silence with the first of several “urgent” messages purporting to come from uss missouri (bb-63) admiral halsey’s flagship (one of missouri’s radio operators was assigned to tucson so that japanese intercepts would hear a familiar “fist”). they also used voice communication to simulate conversations between tf-38’s carriers and their aircraft; placing each speaker in a separate compartment so that the “background noise” was different. after an air strike on the southern island of kyushu by carrier-type aircraft (that were actually land-based on okinawa) tucson faked their return and recovery by tf-38. all of this convinced the japanese that halsey was off the southern tip of their homeland to support an amphibious invasion. troops and aircraft were rushed southward, and tf-38’s actual strike in the north achieved total surprise. according to rear admiral robert carney, halsey’s chief of staff, “there was no resistance to the strike at all.”
Midwatch, àíãëèéñêèé
The middle watch.
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